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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
NAFTA and Regional Free Trade As Seen From
Washington and Geneva
MR. WELLINGTON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome
to New York City. Those of you who are not from New York City,
welcome to the New York Law School in Tribeca, and to this 1997 Otto
L. Walter Symposium. New York Law School is a place that some of you
may not know about. I take it to be a quintessential New York institution.
It's been around for 106 years. I think that makes it the oldest or one of
the oldest freestanding law schools in the country. It's a wonderful,
dynamic, interesting institution with a diverse student population that
reflects the changing nature of the City. It's really a very exciting place
to teach; and it has a marvelous, marvelous faculty that is productive and
extremely concerned with the City and the country and the world. I know
about law school faculties and this really is an extraordinary one. It also
has truly exceptional graduates. Probably our most famous graduate is
John Marshall Harland who served on the Second Circuit and on the
Supreme Court; but, it has a number of graduates who are Federal judges,
State judges, members of the Bar, founders of large law firms, very
successful practitioners in all fields of law, and also very successful
businessmen in the City and in the country, and Hollywood producers,
indeed, who have won Oscars. One of the people who exemplifies I think
the best of our graduates is Otto Walter, and I just want to say a few
words about him. Otto was born in Bavaria in 1907. He began his law
career in Munich and escaped Hitler, and came to New York in 1936.
When he came he was, of course, unable to continue as a lawyer and so
he became a bookkeeper and an accountant in the City and was able in
1940 to set up his own accounting firm, Walter & Company. They were
CPAs. It was located in Manhattan. Then in 1951 at the age of 44, Otto
began his law career again by attending New York Law School. He was
a very successful student. He was on the Law Review here. He then
shortly after graduation in 1955 founded his own law firm. That law firm
today is Walter, Conston, Alexander & Green. It's a well-known firm that
specializes in transnational law, particularly German-American pacts,
estate and commercial law, and comparative law. Otto has now assumed
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the role of Senior Counsel, but he is an active participant in the firm and
he graces it. He's been a great, great friend of New York Law School.
He's been an adjunct professor here and really a benefactor of the
institution, and for me he really exemplifies what this place is about. He's
here today. Otto, could you stand up so we can give you a hand.
(Applause.) Now today's symposium is sponsored by the New York Law
School's Center for International Law. It's a wonderful, wonderful center.
I'll let its Director tell you something about it. It's cosponsored by the
New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law with
the assistance of the International Law Society.
The Director? What about the man on my right, your left, who is the
Director? Sydney M. Cone, III, known far and wide as Terry, not only
is he the Director of the Center but he's also the C.V. Starr Professor of
the Law of International Trade and Finance. I suppose there are very,
very few people, if any, who can match his experience as a lawyer in
international finance. He was for many, many years a member of the firm
of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; and he ran their Paris office. He
was in their Brussels office. He helped found their office in Moscow and
Tokyo. He's been instrumental in making that firm, which is certainly a
premier firm in the field, making its global practice what it is. Not only
that, he is the author of a really terrific book that I urge on all of you
which was published I guess earlier this year, perhaps in September, by
Little, Brown & Company, called "International Trade in Legal Services."
Terry has done a wonderful job since he's come to the New Law School
and here he is. (Applause).
MR. CONE: The Center for International Law at New York Law School
is greatly honored today to have with us Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, the
Arthur Leman Professor of Economics at Columbia. He also has an
appointment as Professor of Political Science at Columbia University
which is a sister school here in New York, and he's made the trip down
from Morningside Heights to be with us. We are very honored to have
him with us today. We're honored to have with us today William J.
Davey, who is the Director of Legal Affairs Division of the World Trade
Organization. He is on leave as a Professor of Law at the University of
Illinois. He has made the somewhat shorter trip today from Geneva to be
with us. We are really privileged to have the two titans - one an
economist, one a renowned legal scholar - in the area of international
trade to be here with us to address perhaps the most vexing trade subject.
If we put to one side Helms Burton, perhaps the most vexing trade subject
today which is regionalism versus multilateralism. At the same time that
the United States was pushing very hard for the conclusion of the Uruguay
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Round, the result of which was the creation of the World Trade
Organization and the coming into force on January 1, 1995 of the most
far-reaching multilateral trade agreements that have ever been concluded,
it was also negotiating a regional agreement, the North American Free
Trade Agreement, and seemed to be pushing in a quite different direction.
If not content with that, the United States has also been talking about
creating something called the Free Trade Area of the Americas. This is
the subject on which Professor Bhagwati has written and spoken in the
past. He clearly is one of the leading commentators on this dilemma, on
this ambivalence, if you will, as between multilateralism and regionalism.
I might add emphatically that Professor Bhagwati, so I just recently
learned, almost went into law and not into economics. His father was a
Justice on the Supreme Court of India and very much wanted him to be a
lawyer. He, at one point, was studying economics at St. John's
Cambridge while reading, or rather eating, to become a barrister at
Lincoln's Inn in London. He, I think, really found the economists at St.
John's more stimulating than the lawyers at Lincoln's Inn, but he claims
that one of the deciding factors was that the food at St. John's was better
than the food at Lincoln's Inn. At any rate, he is a widely renowned
economist and I don't think that we have to regret that he's not a lawyer.
Bill Davey followed a path better known to some of the people in the
room. He went to the University of Michigan Law School. He clerked
on the Supreme Court of the United States for Mr. Justice Potter Stewart.
He worked in the Brussels and New York offices of a well-known
international law firm and he has become a Professor at a law school. As
I mentioned, he is the Director of Legal Affairs Division at the World
Trade Organization in Geneva.
Professor Bhagwati will deal first with President Clinton's Trade
Choices: Regions of the World, a subject that he knows very well. Then,
Professor Davey will talk to us a bit about the World Trade Organization's
newly constituted Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, and also on
the provision in GATT 1994 - Article XXIV of that agreement - that
purports to deal with the problem of regional trade agreements. I am
really pleased. I never thought I would have this honor, and I am really
pleased to have the honor to present to you Professor Jagdish
Bhagwati. (Applause)
(Professor Bhagwati's speech has been omitted)
MR. CONE: Thank you very much. I think it was most illuminating to
hear about the hub and the spokes. The European spokes that Professor
Bhagwati was referring to were the preferential trade agreements with
1998]
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non-European countries by and large or non-Western European countries;
and there are many agreements with former colonies. There are
agreements with specific non-Western European countries and those were
the spokes that he was referring to there. I now would like to give Bill
Davey, Professor Davey, a chance to talk to us about the view from
Geneva. Thank you.
PROFESSOR DAVEY: Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here in New
York and at the New York Law School renewing some acquaintances with
old friends. I've lived in New York four times in my life for various
periods of time, and it's nice to be back. My topic is the World Trade
Organization, the WTO, and its dilemma in dealing with regional trade
associations or arrangements, agreements, whatever, such as NAFTA,
Mercosur, which is in the southern part of South America, ASEAN in
Southeast Asia and the European Union. I'll start with some general
background information, but I should say in overview that although I was
introduced as a professor, I'm now a cautious international bureaucrat. So
I will attempt to be somewhat more factual and even dry and boring
perhaps. But anyway, I'll try not to be too controversial so that I don't get
myself fired. In any event, the view from Geneva, the view of the WTO
on regional trading arrangements is complicated by a dilemma as I said.
The basic principle of GATT and the WTO is the MFN principle, i.e. that
there should not be discrimination between trading partners. In other
words, if I give a benefit to Professor Cone, I have to give to everyone
else in the room, as explained by Professor Bhagwati. Unfortunately, on
an exceptional basis the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT,
and the WTO permit nations to deviate from this MFN principle to form
customs unions and free trade areas. The situation is unfortunate, not so
much because there's this exception, but because the exception is very
ill-defined. The situations in which you can form these areas and the
terms that you have to meet are not precisely set out; and it is further
complicated by the fact that although this exception, when put into the
agreement, was thought not to be very important, over time it has become
used more and more. So what we have is a situation of an ill-defined
exception to the basic rule being used by more and more members of the
organization. Obviously that presents a dilemma for the WTO because
how are you going to be able to control the use of this exception when
virtually all of your members are starting to use it and probably are not
going to be that interested in defining it more precisely. This can be seen
in the ministerial declaration that the WTO issued at its ministerial
conference in Singapore. A ministerial conference is a gathering of
ministers, trade ministers, with the first one held by the WTO in Singapore
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in December '96. It said essentially five things about regional trade
agreements. First, that they're having an increasing influence on
international trade, and there is in particular an increasing concern about
trade diversion. But secondly, going the other direction, it noted that many
developing countries feel that these may be a mechanism by which they
can develop faster. So ministers decided that the WTO should consider
whether further clarification of the rules is necessary and then committed
the WTO to assure that RTAs, regional trading arrangements, are
complimentary to the multilateral trading system and are in conformity
with the rules and that the WTO would further try and liberalize generally
to make them less attractive in the long run. But you can see that
essentially that statement doesn't give very much guidance to what actually
should be done. It represents the fact that when you have almost every
member belonging to a regional trade agreement, it's going to be difficult
to negotiate new rules. Now, what I want to do in the remainder of my
discussion is talk about essentially four topics. First of all, to talk a little
bit about the history and the scope of the problem. Secondly, to describe
the WTO/GATT rules on regional trading agreements, what are they, what
problems there are in their enforcement. Past enforcement will be the
third topic and the fourth topic will be prospects for the future.
The original U.S. proposal for an international trade organization
which ultimately led to GATT included an exception for customs unions.
During the course of negotiations, the exception for customs unions was
broadened to also include free trade areas. The difference between the two
is that in a free trade area, trade between the component members is free
of tariffs and other restrictions. So in NAFTA trade between the United
States and Mexico and Canada is tariff free; but vis-a-vis the rest of the
world, the three components of NAFTA pursues its own commercial
policy. That's a free trade area. A customs union is a free trade area
with a common commercial policy. In other words, the components of a
customs union have one policy, one unified policy, toward the rest of the
world in commercial matters. The example, the classic example, of a
customs union is the European Union. Now obviously free trade areas are
easier to negotiate because you don't have to come up with a mechanism
for coordinating your commercial policy with the rest of the world. So the
decision back in the late '40s to expand the exception from customs unions
to include free trade areas as well meant that it was going to be easier to
deviate from the MFN principle when countries wanted to form these
regional arrangements. Now, at the time, in fairness to the negotiators, this
did not seem to be a big problem. The theoretical economic work on
customs unions and free trade areas was not well-developed. The concerns
of trade diversion as opposed to trade creation were developed by a
19981
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Professor Viner sometime after this provision was written. And it was
thought at the time, a time when tariffs were in the thirty to forty percent
range, that anything that brought tariffs down to zero would be a good step
toward free trade, even if it was just among a few countries. Now, of
course, when tariffs amongst the industrialized countries are five or six
percent, the reduction to zero is no longer so significant. And the third
factor is that no one really expected the customs unions exception to be
used so frequently. Benelux existed. One of the reasons that the U.S. had
proposed the exception in the first place was it did foresee some sort of
European integration; but by and large it was not expected to be used that
much, and in fact in the first 45 years or so of GATT only 83 regional
trading arrangements were notified to GATT, on the average of, say, two
a year. In the last five years, there have been 67 notified, or 12 a year.
So there has been a huge increase recently. Now, I don't want to
overstate that. Some of these are not very important. The Estonia/Slovenia
agreement probably doesn't cover much trade. The Icelandic/Faroe Island
agreement probably doesn't either. But what has resulted is that virtually
all WTO members, I think the exceptions are Japan, Korea and Hong
Kong, virtually everybody else, 127 countries, is involved in some regional
trading arrangement now. That's the history and an indication that the
problem is getting worse.
What are the WTO rules on free trade agreements? The basic rule is
in Article XXIV of GATT. I'll talk mainly about that. I will just mention
that there is also a provision on the formation of customs unions, free trade
areas in the GATS agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services. There's also a provision on the formation of these areas amongst
developing countries in something called the Enabling Clause, which
allows preferential treatment of developing countries. But if you look at
Article XXIV of GATT, paragraph 4 sets out the basic principles. It
recognizes the desirability of economic integration and says that the
purpose of customs unions and free trade areas should be to facilitate trade
between constituent members and not to raise barriers to the trade of other
WTO members with those constituent members. In principle that's not
really such a bad rule. The problem is that it's only a general statement
and there's no agreement on whether or not you really have to comply
specifically with the commitment in that general statement of not raising
trade barriers with the outside. The reason for that lack of agreement is
that the following paragraph, paragraph 5, says "accordingly" if you have
a free trade area or a customs union you should comply with the following
specific rule. And the argument is, well, paragraph 4 sets out a general
principle, you don't have to comply with it. The word "accordingly"
means that you only have to comply with paragraph 5. But it's important
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to remember that this general principle that free trade areas and customs
unions should not raise barriers to the trade of other WTO members with
the constituent members of the customs unions and free trade areas. It is
important to remember that that general principle does exist.
Now, what are the specific requirements in paragraph 5? Paragraph
5 is essentially concerned with the level of restrictions applied to outsiders
before and after the free trade area or customs union is brought into force.
For customs unions the rule is that duties and other regulations of
commerce imposed at the institution of the customs union shall not on the
whole be higher or more restrictive than those that prevailed before the
customs union came into force. The same basic principle applies for free
trade areas. Paragraph 5 also provides that if you have an interim
agreement leading to a free trade area or customs union, and since you
can't do this overnight, there are almost always interim agreements
involved, the interim agreement should only last for a reasonable period
of time. Now, consider the problems that we have in looking at paragraph
5 of Article XXIV. The rule for duties is not so difficult. There are a
lot of calculation issues but basically you can more or less figure out if the
duties went up or down after the formation of the free trade area or
customs unions. But it's unclear what the term "other regulations of
commerce" means to begin with - and measuring whether or not the
incidence of those regulations went up or down or became more restrictive
is also a problem. The third problem is what is a reasonable period of
time. The Turkey-EU customs union took some 30 years to form. Now,
there were other problems in the Turkey-EU relationship but many times
the interim agreements leading supposedly to these free trade areas take a
long time to be implemented. In the Uruguay Round there was an
agreement that normally a ten-year period should be the maximum but it
was stated to apply except in exceptional cases, raising the question of
what constitutes an acceptable case. It's important to remember why the
existence of these problems is important or causes a bigger problem, and
that is that the easier it is to form these entities and deviate from the basic
principle, the more likely they're going to be such entities formed and the
more likely that the general principle in fact won't be applied.
Now, the other substantive aspect of the WTO/GATT control of free
trade areas and customs unions is in paragraph 8 of Article XXIV where
the definitions of free trade area and customs union are given. I've talked
about that in general but paragraph 8 adds one important thought and that
is in order to have a customs union or free trade area duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce, with some exceptions, must be
eliminated between the constituent members with respect to substantially
all trade between them. In other words, you can't have a free trade area
1998l
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in one product. The idea is that if you're going to take advantage of this
exception, you have to have pretty much free trade in the whole amount
of your trade. Now, there are problems with this as well. To begin with,
it's unclear. With duties, it's clear. It's easy to tell whether or not you've
eliminated the duties on trade between the constituent parts. What about
these other restrictive regulations of commerce? It's unclear exactly what
regulations are covered; and in fact when you examine free trade areas and
customs unions, there are usually restrictive regulations on commerce that
have not been eliminated. A second problem is what is substantially all
trade. This is a particular problem with respect to agriculture. Often
agricultural trade is so restricted that there is no trade between the two
constituent members at the beginning. Does that mean there doesn't have
to be in the future, "because we're covering substantially all trade and we
don't allow that trade. So we meet that substantially all trade
requirement." Or should there be some sort of qualitative test that you
have to cover all sectors, or something like that. Anyway, I think you can
say in short there are number of rather significant disputed issues in the
way the WTO/GATT controls free trade areas; and as I've said, the looser
this interpretation, the more likely you'll have these areas. The more areas
and customs unions you have, the more deviation from the basic GATT
principle that most people would say is where the world ought to be going.
Well, how in the past has GATT enforced these rules? I think you
could guess that given the lack of precision in the rules, enforcement was
difficult in GATT. The first issue of course is how did GATT go about
enforcing the rules anyway. And there were essentially two mechanisms.
One was the review by a working party of these agreements, and the
second way to enforce the rules was through dispute settlement.
Paragraph 7 of Article XXIV requires that countries that are going to form
one of these areas notify GATT, or now the WTO, of their decision to
enter into the area; and they're obligated to provide information so that
the area or the customs union can be studied. Prior affirmative approval
though is not required. You just have to submit information and give your
notice. In fact, in GATT practice what would happen is that a working
party, which consists of all members interested in coming to the meeting,
would be formed to study the free trade area or customs union. Well,
some of the people interested in that issue would of course be the members
of the union or the area. So they would be part of the working party
studying the matter. Since in GATT practice recommendations of working
parties have to be by consensus, they would be able to determine whether
or not there would be any conclusions critical of the agreement in the
report. The result is that there were many working party reports, at least
124 one count. Only one agreement was found to be in conformity with
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Article XXIV rules. On the other hand, no agreements were found not
to be in conformity. So you had 123 out of 124 agreements that were
found to be -- well, we couldn't decide. So I think it's fair to say that by
the 1990's the GATT control, at least through that sort of review process,
was completely ineffectual. It was just not working.
Now the second possibility of control that I mentioned was through
dispute settlement. One country that felt it was affected by the free trade
area could complain under the GATT dispute settlement provisions that it
was being denied MFN treatment. There were three cases in which the
GATT compatibility of free trade areas was considered by GATT panels.
But under GATT practice, you needed consensus in the organization to
adopt the report of the panel which might find that a violation of rules had
occurred. Well, since part of the group that had to form the consensus
to adopt the report would be the group that was in the free trade area that
had been criticized, not surprisingly in those three cases, the panel reports
were not adopted. So I think you could say that immediately prior to the
WTO or GATT didn't have an effective way of controlling these free trade
agreements. Now, what are the prospects, to turn to the last topic, for
more effective enforcement under the WTO. Despite the rather tame
ministerial declaration that I mentioned at the outset, there have been two
significant changes under the WTO which may lead to some
improvements. The first is the creation of the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements, and I can imagine what you're thinking that I have
truly become an international bureaucrat because only a bureaucrat could
believe that some sort of substantive problem has been solved by the
creation of a committee. Nonetheless, there is some reason to think that
this committee may have some positive elements. That's a little bit
qualified. Anyway, the committee will have two functions. The first
function will be to take over the review function of working parties,
whether the agreement is under GATT, GATS or the enabling clause.
Now, that doesn't sound like much of an improvement; but if you are just
standardizing the practice in the way in which these agreements are looked
at and considering the fact that many of them are virtually identical,
particularly with respect to a lot of the European agreements, both EU
with other parts of Europe and other parts of Europe with each other in
that other part of Europe, just organizing the work more coherently may
be valuable. In addition, if the review can be made more standardized and
expedited, there will be more information available sooner about these
agreements; and it may be possible if you can get the review done quickly
enough even to sometimes have enough influence on the way these
agreements are implemented, even if you can't change the negotiation. It's
true though that with the consensus rule still prevailing ultimately, the
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chance for real control through review is probably not that great. The
production of more information about these agreements, the transparency
aspect probably will be valuable. The second aspect of the committee's
work is that it is charged with making various systemic studies, how these
agreements affect trade more precisely than has been done in the past.
There are a lot of studies on the effect on duties. It's less clear how the
formation of regional agreements affects the standards that are applied in
telecommunications or issues like that. These other issues are often
covered by free trade areas, but whether or not the way they cover them
promotes ultimately multilateral standards or whether it hinders the
adoption in the long run of multilateral standards is not clear. So it's hoped
that the committee by looking at some of these issues may make some
progress in our ability to decide which parts of regional trade agreements
we should focus on and try and do more about. The second major change
in the WTO is an improved dispute settlement system. Under the
Uruguay Round understanding in Article XXIV, which did not do very
much, it was made clear that issues with respect to regional trade
arrangements are subject to dispute settlement. Under the new WTO
dispute settlement understanding, panel reports are adopted automatically
unless everybody agrees not to adopt them. This means that in the future
a party complaining about a regional trading arrangement will be able to
get a decision of a panel and the panel reports will be adopted. Now, you
shouldn't think that this means that suddenly these regional trading
arrangements will disappear even if there's a negative panel finding; but
it will mean that compensation will be owed by the trading arrangement to
the country that was adversely affected. At least in theory that should be
an improvement over where we were in the past. Today the WTO dispute
settlement system has been operating I suppose for a little over two years.
There's only been one matter challenging a free trade arrangement.
Actually, it was a customs union arrangement, between the EU and
Turkey; and India and Hong Kong both challenged certain aspects of
Turkey's textile restrictions which were put in place when it became part
of the EU's custom union. Now, that case seems to have disappeared at
the moment. They seemed to have reach some sort of settlement, but it
does highlight that there's a potential here of enforcing these rules. This
potential may be quite important because if you think back to those rules
I described, I said there were disputes over how they should be
interpreted. Well, dispute settlement can decide the answer to those
disputes. It will no longer be a question of what the consensus in the room
thinks. It will be what the dispute settlement system thinks. It's possible
that if that dispute settlement system takes a more strict approach to the
interpretation of Article XXIV, that the ability to deviate from the MFN
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principle by invoking Article XXIV will be restricted. So I think that may
be helpful. Now, the one other thing I suppose I should talk about for the
future is would it be possible to change the rules. There have been some
proposals recently that the rules ought to be changed. One proposal you
have in your materials, it's a summary overview of a study that if you look
on the page numbers of the actual document are xi and xii. Anyway, they
make five proposals. One of them is that there should be a more precise
understanding adopted by the WTO of Article XXIV, in particular with
regard to tariffs and rules and origin and that transparency in enforcement
should be promoted. I think it's fair to say that transparency in
enforcement are probably being promoted as much as one can do it at the
moment. Whether or not you could have a new understanding on these
rules, I have some doubts. There was an attempt at the Uruguay Round
to have an understanding on Article XXIV, and there was not much
progress made. One of the most difficult -issues would be if you were
trying to make progress is to decide what to do with all the existing free
trades and customs unions. Would they be grand-fathered in or would they
suddenly be held to higher requirements. It seems unlikely that the many
members of those groups would agree to allow themselves to be held to
higher requirements. The second and third recommendations is to do more
on harmonization of the rules and to push at least the free trade areas
toward custom union-like aspects. The problem with that is that customs
unions are harder to negotiate; and one of the ideas it is made is that, well,
you ought to have a mechanism which every free trade area or customs
union has which explains how to accede to the customs union or free trade
area and that anybody that meets the criteria automatically becomes a
member. Well, you can imagine that working perhaps a bit in free trade
areas; but in customs unions where you have a political component that
makes decisions about the common commercial policy, it's kind of hard to
imagine that sort of accession clause working. Anyway, that's just a
couple of thoughts on those materials. It might be more useful, I suppose,
for me to summarize and to let us go into questions. I think I can
summarize my remarks by saying that the prospects for WTO control of
these entities is not so bad, both through the new Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements and through especially improved dispute settlement
procedures. Secondly, I would also suggest that the interest in regional
trade agreements may be a bit of a fad that may pass. I think at the
moment they are something that is talked about a lot. There are certainly
a lot more of them. The only reason I make this comment, which I know
I'm making up not based on what I said during my talk so far, is that
Professor Bhagwati pointed out that the WTO system is working
reasonably well. One of the major accomplishments at Singapore was an
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agreement on trade and information technology products that has since
been put in place and by July 1st tariffs should be on their way out in
trade in those products and it's a sector that's huge. It's hundreds of
billions of dollars of trade. At the negotiations of that in Singapore, some
countries were hesitant to join because to join the declaration that was
going to be stated on information technology products, they were
committing themselves to go to Geneva in March and make commitments
on technology products. Those commitments of course would come into
effect only if there was a consensus decision of the group involved in this
deal on information technology products to go forward. So it wasn't very
much of an obligation that they were being asked to put their name on at
Singapore; and a number of countries did not do that, even though three
months earlier their presidents had made a similar commitment in APEC.
I had the impression that part of the reason they weren't willing to do it
in Singapore is that when you get down to talking about WTO
commitments you're talking about something serious. When you're talking
at APEC about a presidential declaration, you're not. To a degree I think
there may be a bit of a fad in the regional arrangements. They may be
more about occasions for political leaders to meet at the highest level
which may be quite useful but which may in the end not really lead to real
free trade agreements. The third thing I would say is simply to underscore
what Professor Bhagwati said, that the WTO is working at the moment
reasonably well. The recent negotiations on telecoms were successful. The
ITA that I've already mentioned, to the extent they do succeed, the
original trade agreement problem of course is solved because no one will
have much of an interest in regional trade agreements if in fact you have
an effective multilateral system. Thank you.
MR. CONE: We will do this sort of by consensus. I will assume what
the consensus is. The speakers will remain seated and every one who
wants to address a question will do so and will be recognized and the
speakers remaining seated will answer the questions. Are there any
questions? Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is a question for both panelists. The
Professor Bhagwati's thesis is that the WTO is working and Professor
Davey agrees with that. The examples you're citing are the new
agreements since the last negotiating round. The question is this: In both
of the successes, the recent successes, that you had a confluence of
economic interests that made for everyone able to agree. Yet, in
December when you did you ministerial declaration, everything that I've
read about it was that the whole conference almost came apart over the
[Vol. 18
NAFTA AND REGIONAL FREE TRADE
ministerial declaration, it was so difficult to do, and that all the members
swore that they would never try to do something like that again. And so
my question is: Isn't there a place for regionalism here for incremental
steps where some economic interests are the same as a way to start
momentum as opposed to one where you have everyone on the same wave
length at the same time because otherwise you're going to be delaying
certain movements because you can't get agreement across the board from
all kinds of nations at the same time?
(Professor Bhagwati's response has been omitted)
MR. DAVEY: A couple of things. I think the fact that the market forces
are pushing toward liberalization is probably the most important factor,
and I think it makes it less interesting to think of regional solutions. I think
they are less necessary than Brock might have thought in the early 1980s
when he could not get the Uruguay Rounds started. The other thing is I
think you have to consider often when you're talking about topics that
could come up, you're talking not so much about regional topics but new
subject areas. I'm not sure how much a regional approach helps you in
solving a new subject area of negotiation. It's true that sometimes a
regional agreement might deal with the subject and the model might be
used in the multilateral system, but I'm not sure that that has worked all
that much. The services agreement was a different approach. I mean you
could find some things in NAFTA that were used in the Uruguay Round
but some things in NAFTA that weren't used in the Uruguay Round. If
you think in terms of competition in investment having a small group get
together of like-minded countries rather than the multilateral system isn't
going to get you very far because the small group of like-minded countries
doesn't really need an agreement on investment amongst themselves. It
needs the broader group to come into it. Negotiating their own agreement
and then trying to impose it on the rest in a multilateral context probably
won't work. If you think just in terms of regionalism, there I think you
have the trade diversion issue which if you're just talking about lowering
tariffs. So if you separate out new subjects as opposed to tariff reductions,
I don't think in either case the WTO would necessarily want that. On
tariffs, there's the trade diversion issue on the other subjects and that may
not be the best way to go.
AUDIENCE SPEAKER: (Question inaudible.)
1998]
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MR. DAVEY: Quickly on dispute settlement, I think the system over the
years has become less dependent upon diplomacy and has now reached the
point where it's basically a judicial system. So to the extent that its
success maybe to some degree in the past had some - well, there were
diplomatic elements in it but now there aren't any with reports being
adopted.
MR. CONE: If I could add to that, I have no hesitation in saying that the
world Trade Organization's dispute settlement system is the best
multilateral dispute settlement system that exists. I sort of think, and I
don't this is a purely cynical thought, that is one of the reasons that the
European Union has tried to get Helms Burton before the WTO's dispute
settlement body because that's a dispute settlement body which, were it to
do something, might be effective. But this is not a meeting about Helms
Burton. Although we're past time, maybe we can use the host's
prerogative to say we'll have one more question.
MR. CONE: In the material earlier legal services which I think I know a
little bit about, I wonder if they were liberalized trade even though they
were part of the Uruguay Round. I want to thank Professor Bhagwati and
Mr. Davey for a wonderful contribution to our understanding of the issues
that have been discussed. I can't thank you enough. We will now have
refreshments. I want to thank all of you for coming and contributing to
this conference. Thank you very much.
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